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Abstract 
 
 
To investigate the impact of bank privatization in transition countries, we take the largest 
banks in six relatively advanced countries, namely, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania. Income and balance sheet characteristics are compared across 
four bank ownership types. Efficiency measures are computed from stochastic frontiers and used 
in ownership and privatization regressions having dummy variables for bank type. Our empirical 
results support the hypotheses that foreign-owned banks are most efficient and government-
owned banks are least efficient. In addition, the importance of attracting a strategic foreign 
owner in the privatization process is confirmed. However, counter to the conjecture that foreign 
banks cream skim, we find that domestic banks have a local advantage in pursuing fee-for-
service business.  Finally, we show that both the method and the timing of privatization matter to 
efficiency; specifically, voucher privatization does not lead to increased efficiency and early-
privatized banks are more efficient than later-privatized banks even though we find no evidence 
of a selection effect.  
 
JEL Classifications:  P30, P34, and P52 
 
Keywords: bank efficiency, bank privatization, strategic foreign owner, transition  
countries1. Introduction 
Banking sectors in the transition economies of Central and Southeastern Europe were 
restructured dramatically the 1990s.  Beginning with a financial organization that, in most cases, 
was designed to support the central planning apparatus, new governments moved to create 
modern commercial banking sectors immediately. The first rudimentary step was to divest 
commercial and retail activities from the portfolios of national banks and to set up new joint-
stock banks with universal licenses that were fully state-owned initially. Bank privatization was 
an essential part of the financial reform agendas in these countries. Although much descriptive 
work exists on these financial sector reforms and bank privatizations, e.g., Bonin, Mizsei, 
Székely, and Wachtel (1998), no systematic empirical work was possible until sufficient time 
had elapsed to make the construction of a meaningful dataset possible. The basic issue to 
investigate is whether or not privatization improves bank performance. Although the theoretical 
literature indicates that private firms should outperform government-owned firms, empirical 
evidence is needed to confirm this theoretical hypothesis for banks in transition countries.  
  The empirical literature provides evidence of the influence of ownership on the 
performance of individual banks and on the effectiveness of the banking sector.  In a cross-
country study, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) find that the performance of 
government-owned banks is inferior to that of private banks.  Claessens, Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2001) investigate performance differences between domestic and foreign banks in 
eighty countries, both developed and developing, over an eight-year period from 1988 to 1995.  
These authors find that foreign bank entry was followed by a reduction in both the profitability 
and the overhead expenses of domestic banks and that foreign banks in developing countries 
perform better than do domestic banks. For Latin American countries, Crystal, Dages, and 
Goldberg (2001) argue that foreign bank entry is associated with improved production of 
financial services and more banking competition; in addition, they claim that it facilitates the 
early waves of privatization of government-owned domestic banks.  Hence, this empirical 
literature provides evidence that ownership matters; in particular, government ownership of 
banks is less efficient than private ownership and foreign bank entry has a salutary effect on 
banking sectors.  
Much of the empirical literature on banking in transition countries addresses the impact 
of foreign bank entry on banking efficiency.  Hasan and Marton (2003), Drakos (2003), and Fries and Taci (2003) demonstrate that the entry of more efficient foreign banks creates an 
environment that forces the entire banking system to become more efficient, both directly and 
indirectly, in transition countries.  Buch (2000) compares interest rate spreads in the three fast-
track transition countries, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, from 1995 to 1999.  She 
finds evidence confirming the hypothesis that foreign banks create a more competitive market 
environment in transition economies, but only after they have attained sufficient aggregate 
market share. A few studies examine the effects of ownership on individual bank efficiency.  For 
Poland, Nikiel and Opiela (2002) find that foreign banks servicing foreign and business 
customers are more cost-efficient but less profit-efficient than other banks in Poland.   Bonin, 
Hasan, and Wachtel (2003) examine the performance of banks in eleven transition countries and 
show that majority foreign ownership is associated with improved bank efficiency.  However, 
these authors cannot investigate privatization directly because their data do not distinguish 
among different types of foreign bank ownership.   
Studies focusing specifically on the effects of bank privatization are less numerous. 
Verbrugge, Megginson and Owens (2000) document marginal performance improvements and 
increases in equity among privatized banks in OECD countries.  For Argentina, Clark and Cull 
(1999, 2000) study the privatization process and show that the success of the provincial bank 
privatization depended on the effectiveness of the buyers. These authors find evidence that credit 
allocation and efficiency are higher in privatized banks.  The transformation of the Argentine 
banking system occurred mainly through domestic mergers and acquisitions so that foreign 
banks played only a relatively minor role.  In the transition countries, the prevalence of foreign 
strategic owners in formerly state-owned but subsequently privatized banks makes it crucial to 
distinguish these banks from foreign greenfield banks when analyzing bank privatization.  
In this paper, we focus on six relatively advanced transition countries, namely, Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. We chose not to include banks in 
very small transition economies, e.g., the Baltic countries and Slovenia, and those in less 
advanced transition economies that have only recently restructured the banking system, e.g., the 
former Soviet Union, Albania and the other Balkan states.  In the next section, we present a brief 
description of the privatization experiences in these six countries to establish that the strategies 
and the timing of privatizations are sufficiently different to allow us to use these experiences as 
the basis for an empirical analysis of privatization.  Section 3 describes our dataset and presents the results of testing for differences in means across bank types for several measures of bank 
performance and for several bank characteristics.  Section 4 characterizes briefly our 
methodology of deriving profit and cost efficiency measures from stochastic frontier estimates 
that allow for country and year effects directly in a pooled data set.  In this section, we relate the 
bank efficiency scores, as well as a measure of financial performance, to the type of ownership 
and the method of privatization in second-stage regressions. Section 5 concludes with a brief 
summary focusing on policy implications.  
 
2.  Bank Privatization in Six Transition Economies 
Pre-transition banking sectors were designed to meet the needs of a centrally planned 
economy (CPE).  Intermediation between savers and borrowers was internalized within the state 
banking apparatus basically through a system of directed credits to state-owned enterprises for 
both investment needs and budget allocations for the working capital necessary to meet the 
output plan. In most CPEs, large specialty banks performed specific functions. A state savings 
bank, with an extensive branch network, collected virtually all household deposits. A foreign 
trade bank handled all transactions involving foreign currency. An agricultural bank provided 
short-term financing to the agricultural sector. A construction bank funded long-term capital 
projects and infrastructure development. Hence, banking activities were both subservient to the 
plan and segmented along functional lines in CPEs.  
In the transition economies (TEs), the first step in banking sector reform involved 
creating a two-tier system with commercial banking activities carved out of the old central bank. 
At the beginning of the decade, the new banking sectors in the former CPEs consisted of the 
newly created commercial banks and the specialty banks, both types having universal banking 
licenses, along with a few foreign greenfield banks and often many relatively undercapitalized de 
novo domestic private banks that were born under lax entry requirements.  Specialty banks had 
virtual monopolies in their core activities, e.g., the savings bank was often the only entity with an 
extensive enough branch network throughout the country to collect primary deposits.  Typically, 
three or four large banks dominated the emerging banking sector in a TE.  Both the newly 
created commercial entities and the specialty banks were state-owned initially.  Hence, structural 
segmentation, a proliferation of weak small domestic private banks, and state-ownership of the 
large banks were the major features of banking sectors in TEs at the beginning of the 1990s. These legacies affected the banking sectors in all of the countries in our sample with the 
exception of Croatia, which was part of Yugoslavia.  From the 1950s, commercial banks in 
Croatia as well as the other republics were not state-owned but were owned collectively 
according to the Yugoslavian system of self-management.  Virtually all foreign exchange 
deposits collected by the republic-level banks were remitted to the National Bank of Yugoslavia 
in Belgrade in exchange for credits in dinars.  Upon succession in June 1991, the Yugoslavian 
government froze the foreign exchange deposits of Croatian banks. Hence, Croatian banks faced 
a currency mismatch between assets and liabilities creating large holes in their balance sheets 
after succession. At the end of 1995, four Croatian banks were selected for government 
rehabilitation because of the poor quality of their loan portfolios. Involvement in this program 
resulted in these banks being nationalized so that four large state-owned banks were created in 
Croatia in the middle of the 1990s.   
The three more advanced TEs, i.e., Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, embarked on 
significantly different bank privatizations programs during the first half of the 1990s.  Even 
before the political change, the Hungarian government had been receptive to foreign bank 
activity as it allowed three foreign banks to operate in the country from 1985.  By the end of 
1994, the Hungarian foreign trade bank had been purchased by a foreign owner and foreign 
investors held about 20% of total banking assets in Hungary. In the Czech Republic, three of the 
largest four banks participated in the first wave of voucher privatization in 1992.  Investment funds, 
the largest of which were created by these banks, were an integral part of the Czech voucher 
privatization program.  Hence, this initial divestiture of state holdings resulted in interlocking 
ownership with the state retaining large controlling stakes of voucher-privatized Czech banks. At 
the end of 1994, although foreign investors held about 6% of banking assets in the Czech Republic, 
none of the large banks had any foreign ownership.  With some inducement from the G7 donor 
countries and international financial institutions, Polish authorities set a three-year timetable at the 
beginning of 1993 for privatizing the nine medium-sized, regional, state-owned banks that were 
created from the commercial portfolio of the national bank. However, by the end of 1994, only two 
of these banks had been privatized and only two more would be privatized before 1997.  Foreign 
ownership of banking assets remained insignificant in Poland at about 2% in the mid-1990s. 
Macroeconomic instability and financial sector distress made bank privatization 
infeasible in Bulgaria and Romania during the first half of the 1990s. By 1995, neither Bulgaria nor Romania had privatized any banks and foreign ownership of banking assets was negligible at 
less than 1% in both countries. In Croatia, only one small foreign bank was operating in 1995 
and there was hardly any foreign ownership of banking assets.  Of the six countries, only 
Hungary and to a lesser extent Poland had committed to selling banks to foreign investors by the 
end of the first half of the 1990s.  However, by the end the decade, five of the six countries were 
embarked on, or had completed, privatizations that would put at least 75% of their banking assets 
under foreign control by 2002.   
The second half of the 1990s witnessed a flurry of bank privatizations in these countries.  
Appendix A lists the banks in our sample from each country ranked according to market share at 
the end of the decade.  Information on each bank’s status throughout the 1990s is provided and, 
when relevant, the bank’s privatization is dated. Bank privatization proceeded relatively swiftly 
in Hungary; by mid-1997, eight of the top ten banks were majority foreign-owned.  After a few 
initial bank privatizations, the Polish government became sidetracked by a bank consolidation 
initiative that was intended to fend off foreign competition. Nonetheless, a combination of 
mergers and privatizations involving foreign partners left foreigner investors holding more than 
75% of Polish banking assets by 2000. Although the Czech government was late to recognize the 
importance of attracting strategic foreign investors for its large voucher-privatized banks, all major 
banks were sold to foreign owners by mid-2001.  
Both of the southeastern TEs, i.e., Bulgaria and Romania, began bank privatization only 
in the late 1990s.  After instituting a currency board and stabilizing the macroeconomic 
environment, the Bulgarian government privatized its first bank to a consortium of investors in 
1997.  By the end of 2000, eight of the ten largest banks in Bulgaria were foreign owned. 
Romania is a laggard in bank privatization compared to the other former CPEs.  In 2000, foreign 
investors owned less than half of Romanian banking assets and two of the three largest banks 
remained state-owned as late as 2003.  Beginning in 1995 with virtually no holdings in Croatia, 
foreigner investors had acquired about 84% of banking assets by 2000 and, by 2002, all of the 
ten largest banks in the country were majority foreign owned.  
In summary, Hungary was the first country to shed the legacies of the CPE by privatizing 
all but one of its major banks by mid-1997. In Poland, after some delay in the privatization 
timetable, only the zloty savings bank and the umbrella agricultural bank remain state-controlled. 
Initially, the Czech Republic placed three big banks in the voucher privatization program but, despite a late start, foreign investors gained control of all large Czech banks by mid-2001.  The 
banking sectors in Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia were financially distressed in the first half of 
the 1990s, albeit for different reasons, so that bank privatization could not begin until the late 
1990s.  Once started, sales of banks to foreign investors were rapid in Bulgaria and Croatia.  
Romania is the only one of the six transition countries in this study to retain significant 
government ownership in its banking sector through 2003 with only one of its three largest banks 
privatized. 
 
3.  The Data and Bank Characteristics by Type 
The dataset consists of the largest banks by asset size in the six selected countries. As is 
shown in Appendix A, the smallest bank in the sample has a market share ranging between 2% in 
the Czech Republic and 4% in Poland.  Taken together, the large banks in our sample hold more 
than 75% of the banking assets in their respective countries.
1   Restricting the sample to large 
banks yields a more homogeneous set of observations than is often found in other studies of 
banking in transition countries.  Homogeneity is important for investigating the effects of 
privatization on individual banks because privatized state-owned banks are usually among the 
largest banks in their respective countries.  Moreover, our sample contains a sufficient number of 
large banks of various types to make comparisons meaningful.   
Balance sheet and income data are taken from Thompson’s BankScope and Bureau van 
Dijk.  Data for each bank was examined to insure that all available relevant information was 
used.  Thus, we took care to avoid duplicating data for the same bank when alternative 
accounting standards or different levels of consolidation are reported in BankScope.  The total 
number of bank observations is 451; a bank observation is datum for an individual bank in a 
particular year. We have information for 67 different banks from 1994 to 2002, although data are 
not available for every year for every bank.
2  Most of the observations are for 1995 to 2001 as 
                                                 
1  There are not exactly ten banks for several countries because of data limitations.  Moreover, by the end of the 
1990s, some of the large banks in several of the countries are the result of mergers and acquisitions; whenever 
possible, we included the precursor organizations in our dataset.   
2  No data were available for three foreign banks listed in Appendix A because their balance sheets were 
consolidated with their parent banks.   Table 1 indicates.  In terms of country coverage, Romania has the fewest observations 
accounting for 9.1% of the total while Poland has the most at 25.5%.
3   
  To facilitate our investigation of privatization, we divide the observations into four 
mutually exclusive bank types, namely foreign greenfield, domestic de novo, state owned, and 
privatized.  As reported in Table 1, foreign greenfield banks constitute almost a quarter of all 
bank observations, which indicates the importance of foreign penetration into the banking sectors 
of these six transition countries. Domestic de novo banks make up the smallest category because 
only a few of the domestic entrants in the early 1990s grew to become one of the ten largest 
banks in its country by the end of the decade. About 10% of the total, or about 38% of the 
observations in the state-owned category, are banks that were not privatized during our sample 
period.
4  The majority of the observations in the state-owned category represent the pre-
privatization histories of banks that were privatized within the sample time period.  Adding the 
post-privatization experiences of both these banks and those banks that were privatized 
throughout the sample period to these pre-privatization histories encompasses almost half of all 
bank observations in our sample.
5 
 Privatization  is  concentrated in the post-1997 period as Table 1 indicates. The three years 
prior to 1997 account for less than 20% of the observations for privatized banks.
6  In contrast, 
about 79% of all privatized observations come from the years between 1997 and 2001.
7  Table 1 
contains additional information about the privatization process.  The column labeled strategic 
owner indicates that a strategic foreign investor has a majority-controlling stake in a privatized 
bank or, in a few cases, in a domestic de novo bank. By definition, foreign greenfield banks are 
controlled by a strategic foreign owner but these banks are not included in this column.  Almost 
one fourth of all the bank observations are foreign greenfield operations and almost the same 
fraction is domestic banks with a strategic foreign investor.   In about 74% of all privatized 
                                                 
3  The large proportion of bank observations from Poland reflects the mergers and acquisitions that took place in that 
country in the late 1990s; when data are available we include observations for the major predecessor banks. 
4 Six large banks, two in Bulgaria (DSK and Biochim), two in Poland (PKO and BGZ), and two in Romania (BCR 
and CEC), account for these observations as Appendix A indicates. 
5 Eight banks in the data set were privatized throughout the time period.  These are the three voucher-privatized 
Czech banks (KB, CS, and IPB), two banks in Hungary (MKB and General Banking Trust), and three banks in 
Poland (BRE, BSK, and WBK). For these banks, we have no pre-privatization histories. 
6 In addition to the eight banks already identified, two banks in Hungary (OTP in 1995 and BB in 1996) and two 
banks in Poland (BPH in 1995 and BG in 1996) are privatized prior to 1997. 
7  Only limited data were available for 2002 when the data set was constructed; there are 9 observations of which 4 
are for privatized banks.   observations, the bank has a strategic foreign owner.  Across countries, the percentage of 
privatized observations having a strategic foreign owner ranges from 43% in the Czech Republic, 
mainly due to voucher privatization, and 50% in Romania, due to its late start on bank 
privatization, to 72% in Hungary and more than 80% in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Poland.    
  To investigate whether bank privatization matters, we report the means for various 
performance measures and characteristics by bank type in Table 2.  With the exception of assets, 
all means are adjusted to remove country and year fixed effects.
8   The means are shown for each 
of the four ownership categories and for the whole sample.  In addition, the last two columns 
show the means for the pre-privatization histories and the post-privatization experiences of the 
banks privatized in our sample period. Table 3 contains signed t-statistics for tests comparing the 
means between privatized banks and each other bank type as well as between post-privatization 
histories and pre-privatization experiences.  A positive (negative) sign on a t-statistic indicates 
that privatized banks have a higher (lower) mean for that measure than do banks in the 
comparison category. Statistical significance at the 5% or better level is represented by a bold t-
statistic in Table 3. 
Taking bank characteristics first, privatized banks are the largest of the four classes and 
foreign greenfield banks are the smallest at about half the average size of domestic de novo 
banks. To some extent, the difference in the mean asset size of state-owned and privatized banks 
reflects the timing of privatization.  The first and last columns of Table 3 present the effects of 
the bank privatization process.  Prior to privatization, banks are recapitalized and their balance 
sheets are cleaned of some bad loans.  Reflecting this preparation, the equity ratio increases 
significantly and becomes comparable that of foreign greenfield banks in privatized banks.   
However, privatization is not associated with a significant decrease in loan loss provisioning or 
liquid asset holding. Relative to foreign greenfield banks, privatized banks have higher liquid 
asset and loan loss provision ratios.   The high liquid asset ratio of privatized banks reflects the 
legacy of state ownership on their balance sheets even though their equity ratios become 
comparable to those of foreign greenfield banks.  
  Regarding performance measures, the most popular one used in the financial literature is 
return on assets (ROA).  From Tables 2 and 3, ROA is significantly higher in privatized banks 
                                                 
8 The adjustment is made by regressing the particular bank characteristic on dummy variables for countries and 
years.  The adjusted value is the regression residual plus the overall mean; hence, it has the country and year effects 
removed. than in either state-owned or domestic de novo banks and lower, but not significantly so, than in 
foreign greenfield banks. After privatization, ROA increases dramatically from less than one-half 
of one percent to over one and a half percent.  To investigate the profitability of privatized banks 
further, we take net interest margin to represent a profit rate on lending and the commission-to-
income ratio to represent the profitability of fee-for-service activities.  Net interest margin is 
higher in privatized banks than in domestic de novo private banks but it is not significantly 
different between privatized banks and either state-owned or foreign greenfield banks nor does it 
increase significantly after privatization. Somewhat surprisingly, privatized banks have the 
highest commission income ratio and one significantly greater than that of foreign greenfield 
banks; this ratio also increases significantly after privatization.  The presence of a strategic 
foreign owner in most privatized banks may explain the increased focus on fee-for-service 
business after privatization. 
  On the cost side, privatized banks have lower cost ratios than state-owned banks but 
higher ratios than foreign greenfield banks; although the cost ratio drops by about 20% after 
privatization, this decrease is not statistically significant at the 5% level.  To probe cost 
management further, we consider the non-interest expenditure ratio.  Privatized banks are 
outperformed again by foreign greenfield banks but there are no significant differences with 
other types.  After privatization, this ratio increases although not significantly perhaps indicating 
the need to incur expenses to modernize and upgrade technology.   
Turning to the intermediation measures, privatized banks have significantly lower loan-
to-asset ratios and significantly higher deposit-to-assets ratios than foreign greenfield banks.  No 
other differences are statistically significant.  Hence, privatized banks retain their comparative 
advantage in collecting primary deposits.
9  However, despite having a smaller domestic deposit 
base, foreign greenfield banks are more aggressive than privatized banks in lending to domestic 
firms. Overall, our results indicate that privatization improves the financial and business situation 
of banks in these transition countries, making them comparable to foreign greenfield banks in 
some respects, but it has no statistically discernible impact on intermediation. Financially 
speaking, privatization matters in terms of increased profitability, more fee-for-service income, 
and, to a lesser extent, improved cost management. 
                                                 
9  The measure of deposits does not differentiate between primary, i.e., household deposits, and commercial 
deposits.  Since commercial deposits are strongly positively correlated with business loans, we infer that privatized 
banks are still the major collectors of primary deposits in these countries.   
4.   Efficiency Estimates and Regression Results 
  Although the accounting data are informative, we focus on efficiency measures to 
investigate the impact of ownership and privatization on bank performance. Berger, DeYoung, 
Genay and Udell (2000) review the literature on applying stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to 
estimate bank efficiency.  Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2003) use this approach to examine the 
efficiency of banks in transition economies. In this paper, we use similar frontier specifications 
so that we provide only a brief summary of the salient features.  
The model estimated for cost efficiency is given by:  
  Y it  = f (Xit, Pit, Zit)  +  vit +   uit, 
where Y represents total costs that are a function of various outputs, X, the price of inputs, P, and 
fixed effects for years and countries, Z.  As is common in the efficiency literature, we use a 
translog specification for the function with standard symmetry and homogeneity assumptions.  
The random disturbance term has two components; vit represents measurement error and other 
uncontrollable factors, while uit represents technical and allocative inefficiency.  The frontier 
approach maintains that managerial or controllable inefficiencies, i.e., uit, increase costs above 
the frontier or best-practice levels that are subject to random fluctuations, i.e., vit.   We use a 
similar specification for the profit function except that Y is total profits and the disturbance 
becomes vit -   uit because managerial inefficiency reduces profits below the frontier or best 
practice level.    
The vit terms are assumed to be identically distributed as normal variates with zero mean 
and variance equal to
2
v σ .  The uit terms are nonnegative random variables distributed normally 
but truncated below zero.  We assume that the uit terms are distributed independently but not 
identically.  Hence, for the i–th bank in year t, technical inefficiency, uit, is assumed to follow a 
half normal distribution with a non-constant variance, i.e., N(µ,
2
u σ it). Because structural 
conditions in the banking sector and general macroeconomic conditions may generate 
differences in banking efficiency from country to country and over time, we include both country 
effects and time effects in the estimation of the frontier.  Specifically, the year and country 
effects appear in the cost and profit functions directly and as determinants of the variance, i.e., 
2
u σ it = Zit δ.   Total costs are the sum of interest and non-interest costs. The output variables  are total 
deposits, total loans, total liquid assets and investments other than loans and liquid assets.  The 
input prices are the price of capital, measured by the ratio of non-interest expenses to total fixed 
assets, and the price of funds, measured by the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits. Total 
profit is measured by net profit earned by the bank.  The output variables and costs or profits are 
normalized by total loans and the input variable is the ratio of the price of capital to the price of 
funds.  Thus, the specification assumes homogeneity with respect to prices and constant returns 
to scale.  Following the literature, we add a constant amount to profit for all banks to avoid 
having negative net profits for any bank observation so that we may take logarithms of all profit 
function variables.  We also estimated frontiers with alternative measures of cost and profit.  The 
cost frontier for non-interest expenditure is virtually identical to the total cost frontier and is not 
discussed.  The profit function using commission income is included in the ownership 
regressions below.  The stochastic frontiers are estimated with the LIMDEP Version 8 developed 
by William Greene.
10    
  Summary statistics for estimates of the stochastic frontiers are given in Appendix B.  
These statistics are the ratio of the standard deviation of the inefficiency component of the 
disturbance to the random component (σ  u / σ  v  ), the standard deviation of the composite 
disturbance (σ), and the proportion of the variance in the overall disturbance that is due to 
inefficiency,  λ  = σu
2/ σ
2.  As Appendix B indicates, most of the variation in the disturbance 
from best practice is due to technical inefficiency rather than random error.   Since the cost and 
profit frontiers are translog functions, efficiency is defined as  e
-u, where u is the estimated 
inefficiency.  Hence, efficiency is always positive and it is equal to one for the best-practice or 
zero-inefficient bank. Individual bank efficiency is measured relative to best practice; the means 
and standard deviations of cost and profit efficiency are reported in Appendix B.     
To investigate the impact of privatization on bank efficiency, we take the efficiency 
scores for each bank observation as the dependent variable in second-stage regressions having 
dummy variables for bank type as explanatory variables.  The regression coefficients are shown 
in Table 4; the omitted ownership category is domestic de novo private banks. All of the 
regressions include dummy variables to account for country and year fixed effects, although the 
coefficients of these variables are not reported. Because bank privatizations in these six countries 
                                                 
10  Econometric Software, Inc. (www.limdep.com).  usually involve selling a state-owned bank to a strategic foreign owner, we include a dummy 
variable to test for the incremental impact of strategic foreign ownership.
 11  The dependent 
variables for the four regressions in Table 4 are cost and profit efficiency, an alternative measure 
of profit efficiency, i.e., commission income efficiency, and a performance measure, i.e., ROA, 
for comparison.   
Taking ROA first, ownership type explains very little of the overall variation in this 
financial performance measure.
12  Foreign greenfield banks (C1) and privatized banks (C4) have 
significantly higher ROAs than domestic private banks, by 2% and 1.6% on average 
respectively, but the presence of a strategic foreign owner (S) has no additional impact on ROA. 
In the final two rows of Table 4, we include the p-values for tests of differences between 
privatized banks (C4) and state-owned banks (C3) and between privatized banks having a 
strategic foreign owner (C4 + S) and state-owned banks. In both cases, privatized banks have 
significantly higher ROAs than their state-owned counterparts. This analysis confirms our earlier 
means tests indicating that privatized banks have higher earnings than state-owned banks in these 
transition countries. 
Turning to the efficiency regressions, we find that these regressions explain a substantial 
percentage of the variation in efficiency.
13   Foreign greenfield banks are significantly more cost 
and profit efficient and state-owned banks are significantly less cost and profit efficient than 
domestic private banks.  Although privatized banks are significantly less profit efficient than 
domestic private banks, the presence of a foreign owner improves the profit efficiency of a bank 
significantly. No significant differences are found between privatized banks and domestic private 
banks regarding cost efficiency. Other comparisons relevant to the impact of privatization are 
shown by the hypothesis tests in the final two rows of the table.  Specifically, all privatized 
banks and privatized banks having a strategic foreign owner are significantly more cost efficient 
than state-owned banks.  When all privatized banks are considered, no significant difference in 
profit efficiency relative to state-owned banks is found.  However, the presence of a strategic 
foreign owner yields significantly higher profit efficiency. Hence, attracting a strategic foreign 
owner in the privatization process improves both profit and cost efficiency.  
                                                 
11 In 74% of all privatized-bank observations, a strategic foreign owner is present.  If the observations for the Czech 
voucher-privatized banks are excluded, this percentage is even higher.  
12 Much of the explained variation is due to country and year fixed effects that are not reported in the table.  
Regressions using other performance measures, which we do not report, exhibit even weaker explanatory power. 
13 The coefficient of variation for ROA is 2.9 while it is 0.5 or less for the three efficiency measures. The regression using an efficiency measure based on commission income confirms our 
earlier means tests.  Foreign greenfield banks are significantly less efficient than domestic 
private banks in fee-for-service activities even though the literature suggests that these banks 
were involved in targeting this profitable business in the transition economies. Moreover, all 
privatized banks are significantly more efficient at attracting fee-for-service business than are 
state-owned banks, although the coefficient measuring the incremental impact of a strategic 
foreign owner is not significant. Taken together, our results suggest that domestic private banks, 
either de novo or privatized, have a local comparative advantage in generating fee-for-service 
income and that banks focus more on, and become more efficient at, this activity after 
privatization. 
In summary, the ownership regressions indicate that, compared with other bank types, 
foreign greenfield banks are the most efficient, except in generating fee-for-service business, and 
that state-owned banks are the least efficient.  In addition, we find evidence that having a 
strategic foreign owner matters to bank efficiency after privatization.  To investigate directly the 
impact of privatization, we divide the state-owned category into two groups: banks that are 
always state-owned in our sample (C30) and observations representing the state-owned pre-
privatization histories of banks that are privatized within the sample period (C31). In addition, 
we divide the privatized category into three groups: banks that are always privatized in our 
sample excluding voucher privatized banks (C40), denoted early-privatized banks, observations 
representing the post-privatization experiences of banks that are privatized during the sample 
time period (C41), denoted later-privatized banks, and observations representing the voucher 
experiences of the three Czech banks (C42), denoted voucher-privatized banks.
14  
The impact of privatization on cost and profit efficiency is shown in the regressions in 
Table 5; country and year dummies are included but their coefficients are not reported. The 
coefficients for foreign greenfield banks change very little in magnitude from Table 4; they 
remain positive and highly significant as expected.  State-owned banks that were not privatized 
during the sample period (C30) remain significantly less efficient than domestic private banks by 
both measures.  Although later-privatized banks are also less cost efficient than domestic private 
banks during their state-owned years, the statistical significance of this difference is lower than it 
                                                 
14 In our sample, we have four observations that pertain to years in which the Czech banks were privatized to 
strategic foreign investors. These observations are included in C41 not C42 so that C42 contains only the voucher 
experiences of these three banks.  is for banks that remain state-owned throughout the sample period. No other coefficients are 
significant in the cost efficiency regression; in particular, having a strategic foreign owner does 
not lead to an increase in cost efficiency for privatized banks.   
The p-values for additional hypothesis tests provide some evidence that the timing of 
privatization matters to cost efficiency. First, early-privatized banks (C40) are significantly more 
cost efficient than banks that remain state-owned throughout the sample (C30).  Second, early-
privatized banks (C40) are significantly more cost efficient relative to the pre-privatization 
histories of banks that are privatized in the sample (C31).  In addition, a comparison of later-
privatized banks (C41) with their state-owned pre-histories (C31) does not yield significant 
improvements in cost efficiency even when the incremental effect of a strategic owner is added 
(C41 + S).  Finally, early-privatized banks (C40) are significantly more cost efficient than later-
privatized banks (C41), indicating that the timing of privatization is important. Our results 
suggest that achieving the full impact of privatization on cost efficiency may take some time.
15   
These timing results are confirmed in the profit regression; in addition, the importance of 
the method of privatization is shown. First, voucher privatization does not compare with private 
ownership; voucher-privatized banks are significantly less profit efficient than domestic private 
banks.  Second, voucher privatization does not lead to any improvement in profit efficiency; the 
comparison of voucher-privatized banks (C42) with the state-owned pre-privatization histories of 
privatized banks (C31) indicates no significant difference. Third, the comparison of voucher-
privatized banks with early-privatized banks (C40) indicates that voucher-privatized banks are 
significantly less profit efficient than their counterparts that are privatized by other methods.  
Finally, later-privatized banks that attract a strategic foreign owner (C41 + S) are significantly 
more profit-efficient than voucher-privatized banks. Hence, we find no evidence of any 
significant improvement in efficiency attributable to voucher privatization.
16  
Finally, the positive impact on profit efficiency of having a strategic foreign owner, 
which we find in the ownership regression, is confirmed in the privatization regression.  The 
coefficient measuring the incremental effect of a strategic foreign owner is positive and 
significant at the 5% level in the profit regression. Moreover, the importance of attracting a 
                                                 
15 We tested for selection effects in the privatization process between banks that remain state-owned throughout the 
sample (C30) and the pre-privatization histories of later-privatized banks (C31).  No significant differences between 
these coefficients are found in either the cost or the profit regression. 
16 Similar comparisons of voucher-privatized banks with other bank types yield no significant differences in the cost 
efficiency regression. strategic foreign owner is evident from the comparison between post-privatization experiences 
and pre-privatization histories.  Comparing all later-privatized banks (C41) to their pre-
privatization histories (C31) yields no significant difference in profit efficiency.  However, when 
the incremental effect of a strategic foreign owner is included (C41 + S), the difference is 
significant at about the 6% level. Hence, we find evidence that attracting a strategic foreign 
owner in the privatization process increases a bank’s profit efficiency.  
In conclusion, the differences in the hypothesis tests using cost and profit efficiency 
measures suggest that, although banks sold to foreign owners are not more cost-efficient 
immediately after privatization, they do manage revenues more efficiently.  The means test in 
Table 3 and the ownership regression in Table 4 indicate that banks pursue more fee-for-service 
business and do so more successfully after privatization.  Taken together, these results suggest 
that privatized banks with strategic foreign owners redirect their attention to this profitable 
business. However, generating commission income requires an upgrading of both technology 
and human capital, which may have adverse effects on the cost side of the ledger for privatized 
banks and explain the insignificant findings for cost efficiency.  Moreover, the robust result that 
early-privatized banks are more efficient than later-privatized banks suggests that more time may 
be needed to achieve the full benefits of bank privatization in transition countries. Finally, our 
findings indicate that voucher privatization does not lead to any increase in bank efficiency while 
attracting a strategic foreign investor results in higher profit efficiency.  Hence, we conclude that 
both the method and the timing of privatization matter to bank efficiency.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Our empirical analysis confirms the propositions in the literature that government 
ownership of banks is inefficient and that the entry of foreign banks, which are the most efficient 
of all bank types, improves the performance of banking sectors in transition countries. The 
strategy of privatizing large state-owned banks by selling them to strategic foreign investors after 
recapitalization and cleaning the balance sheets, espoused by the policy literature for small, open 
transition countries, is supported by our empirical findings. In terms of equity and earnings, 
privatized banks resemble foreign greenfield banks although they have higher loan loss 
provisions and more liquid portfolios.  In contrast to the conjecture in the literature that foreign 
banks engage in cream skimming, we find that domestic banks, both privatized and de novo, are more successful in pursuing fee-for-service business than are foreign banks. Although privatized 
banks retain their inherited ability to collect primary deposits, they make fewer loans relative to 
assets than do foreign banks and focus more on commission income after privatization. 
Disappointingly, we find no evidence that these newly privatized banks are contributing to 
improving the effectiveness of financial intermediation in their respective countries. 
Our empirical evidence indicates that the timing of privatization affects bank efficiency. 
Early-privatized banks are more efficient than later-privatized banks. In addition, compared to 
their pre-privatization histories, later-privatized banks are not more efficient. Although this 
might indicate that the better banks were privatized first, we find no statistically significance 
evidence that the state-owned banks remaining to be privatized are less efficient than were the 
privatized banks when they were state owned. Because we find no evidence of a selection effect, 
we attribute the above efficiency differences to a lag in achieving the full benefits of 
privatization. We do find that banks having a strategic foreign owner are more profit, but not 
cost, efficient after privatization.  Taking into account the change in business strategy of focusing 
more on commission income after privatization, we infer that privatized banks incur increased 
cost to upgrade their technology and human capital to compete successfully for this profitable 
fee-for-service business but that this investment affects adversely current cost efficiency.   
The method of privatization also matters. We find no evidence of any improvements from 
voucher privatization; for example, early-privatized banks are significantly more profit efficient 
than voucher-privatized banks during a comparable time period. We find evidence to support the 
prescribed policy of attracting a strategic foreign owner in the privatization process. Later-
privatized banks are not more efficient until the impact of a strategic foreign owner is 
considered. In addition, banks having a strategic foreign owner are more profit efficient after 
privatization but such comparisons for all later-privatized banks do not yield this result.  Finally, 
as a cautionary note for further research, our empirical results indicate that financial performance 
measures are not sufficient to detect the impact of bank privatization in transition countries.  
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Table 1  
 
Distribution of Observations across Bank Types 
 
 
 Foreign 
Greenfield 
(1) 
Domestic  
De novo  
(2) 
State  
Owned 
(3) 
Privatized 
 
(4) 
TOTAL  Strategic 
Owner 
Bulgaria 15 
(22.1) 
0 
(0) 
37 
(54.4) 
16 
(23.5) 
68 
(15%) 
19% 
Czech 
Rep 
22 
(33.8) 
9 
(13.8) 
6 
(9.2) 
28 
(43.1) 
65 
(14.4%) 
18% 
Croatia 22 
(28.2) 
38 
(48.7) 
11 
(14.1) 
7 
(9.0) 
78 
(17.3%) 
14% 
Hungary 28 
(33.3) 
4 
(4.8) 
13 
(15.5) 
39 
(46.4) 
84 
(18.6%) 
33% 
Poland 8 
(7.0) 
16 
(13.9) 
46 
(40.0) 
45 
(39.1) 
115 
(25.5%) 
31% 
Romania 15 
(36.6) 
8 
(19.5) 
12 
(29.3) 
6 
(14.6) 
41 
(9.1%) 
7% 
TOTAL 
 
110 
24.4% 
75 
16.6% 
125 
27.7% 
141 
31.3% 
451 
100.0% 
23% 
 
Notes 
 
(i)  Entries are numbers of bank observations.  
(ii)  The percentage distribution by bank type within each country is in parentheses.  
(iii)  The column labeled TOTAL shows the number of observations in each country and 
the percentage distribution. 
(iv)  The row labeled TOTAL shows the number of observations by bank type and the 
percentage distribution.  
(v)  For strategic owner, the number shown is the percentage of all bank observations in 
the row. 
 
 
 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Number  47 55 55 54 59 59 59 54 9 
Number 
Privatized 
and %  
6 
13% 
9 
16% 
11 
20% 
16 
30% 
19 
32% 
24 
41% 
27 
46% 
25 
46% 
4 
44% 
 
  
Table 2 
 
Bank Performance and Characteristics by Bank Type 
 
Banks Privatized in 
Sample* 
 Foreign 
Greenfield 
Domestic  
De Novo 
State  
Owned 
Privatized TOTAL 
Pre Post 
Return on 
Assets 
0.0224  0.0051 0.0042 0.0176 0.0133  0.0047  0.0158 
Commission 
income ratio 
0.014  0.0164 0.0130 0.0186 0.0155  0.0145  0.0204 
Net interest 
margin ratio 
0.0417  0.0375 0.0424 0.0439 0.0422  0.0388  0.0449 
Cost  ratio  0.1005  0.1434 0.1862 0.1302 0.1402  0.1631  0.1331 
Non interest 
expenditure 
ratio 
0.0446  0.0713 0.0754 0.0649 0.0652  0.0619  0.0686 
Loan  ratio  0.4801  0.3945 0.3734 0.3797 0.4038  0.3745  0.3526 
Deposit  ratio  0.7542  0.7583 0.7850 0.7769 0.7690  0.7738  0.7754 
Liquid asset 
ratio 
0.4378  0.4340 0.4932 0.4924 0.4707  0.4924  0.5185 
Equity  ratio 0.1171  0.1009 0.0729 0.1122 0.1041  0.0855  0.1187 
Loan loss 
provision 
ratio 
0.0083  0.0171 0.0177 0.0133 0.0142  0.0135  0.0103 
Assets (000$)  
Not adjusted 
813,024  1,606,922 3,036,874 4,742,269 2,798,652  2,501,847  4,073,382 
 
Notes 
 
(i)  The total sample size is 451, although not all data are available for every variable.  
(ii)  All variables, except return on assets and assets, are ratios to total assets. 
(iii)  Each entry, except assets, is adjusted to remove the fixed country and year effects.  
  
* These columns include observations for banks that were privatized in our sample only; there 
are 78 pre-privatization histories and 83 post-privatization bank experiences. However, 
observations for the second privatizations of the Czech voucher privatized banks are not 
included. 
 
  
 
Table 3 
 
Significance of Differences in Bank Performance and Characteristics  
 
Privatized banks less:   
State owned  Domestic De 
Novo 
Foreign 
Greenfield 
Post less pre-
privatization 
Return on Assets   2.58   2.92  -1.47   2.12 
Commission income 
ratio 
 5.18   1.68   4.29   3.73 
Net interest margin 
ratio 
 0.39   2.95   1.12   1.57 
Cost ratio  -3.68  -1.48   4.76  -1.75 
Non interest 
expenditure ratio 
-1.06 -0.86   4.97   0.63 
Loan  ratio   0.38  -0.84  -5.59  -1.05 
Deposit  ratio  -0.81   1.41   1.97   0.11 
Liquid asset ratio  -0.04   2.76   2.93   1.09 
Equity ratio   5.17   2.14  -0.25   3.37 
Loan loss provision 
ratio 
-0.73 -0.78   2.59  -0.50 
Assets 
(Not adjusted) 
 3.25   7.26   9.81   2.65 
 
 
Notes (in addition to those to Table 2) 
 
(i)  The entries are signed t-statistics for the significance of the difference specified. 
(ii)  Bold entries are significant at approximately the 5% level or better. 
  
Table 4 
 
Ownership regressions 
 
   Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
Commission 
income 
efficiency 
Return on 
assets 
Constant   0.762* 
(.026) 
0.265* 
(0.039) 
0.835* 
(0.024) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
Foreign Greenfield  C1  0.070* 
(0.019) 
0.170* 
(0.029) 
-0.051* 
(0.018) 
0.020* 
(0.006) 
State owned   C3  -0.061* 
(0.020) 
-0.153* 
(0.029) 
-0.038# 
(0.018) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
Privatized   C4  -0.006 
(0.022) 
-0.172* 
(0.032) 
0.038 
(0.020) 
0.016* 
(0.007) 
Strategic owner  S  0.016 
(0.021) 
0.123* 
(0.032) 
-0.035 
(0.020) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
 Adjusted R
2   .709  .441  .712  .075 
HYPOTHESIS TESTS       
Privatized vs. 
State owned 
H0: 
C4 = C3 
.0081 .5691 .0001  .0135 
Privatized with 
strategic owner vs. 
state owned 
H0: 
C4+S =C3 
.0024 .0002 .0234  .0086 
 
Notes 
 
(i)  The omitted category is domestic private banks.   
(ii)  The sample size is 435.   
(iii)  All regressions include fixed effects for years and countries, although these 
coefficients are not reported.   
(iv)  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
(v)  For regression coefficients, the symbol * indicates significance at the 1% level and 
the symbol # indicates significance at the 5% level. 
(vi)  For hypothesis tests, entries are the significance levels for χ
2 tests for rejection of the 
null hypotheses indicated. 
 Table 5 
 
Privatization Regressions 
 
   Cost  efficiency 
 
Profit efficiency 
Constant   0.762* 
(0.027) 
0.292* 
(0.041) 
Foreign Greenfield  C1  0.067* 
(0.019) 
0.163* 
(0.029) 
Always state owned  C30  -0.076* 
(0.024) 
-0.139* 
(0.035) 
State owned prior to 
privatization in sample 
C31 -0.049# 
(0.021) 
-0.160* 
(0.032) 
Always privatized  C40  0.048 
(0.030) 
-0.034 
(0.045) 
Privatized in sample  C41  -0.022 
(0.024) 
-0.178* 
(0.036) 
Voucher privatization  C42  -0.013 
(0.036) 
-0.244* 
(0.053) 
Strategic owner  S  0.004 
(0.023) 
0.085# 
(0.034) 
 Adjusted R
2   .713  .461 
HYPOTHESIS TESTS    
Privatized early or late   H0:  C40 = C41  .0036  .0001 
Strategic owner matters  H0:  S = 0  .8786  .0141 
Voucher differs  H0:  C40 = C42  .1649  .0012 
 H 0:  C31 = C42  .3105  .1156 
 H 0:  C41 = C42  .8095  .2497 
 H 0:  C41+S = C42  .8753  .0063 
 H 0:  C40+S = C42  .1110  .0000 
Privatization matters  H0:  C30 = C40  .0001  .0256 
 H 0:  C31 = C41  .2753  .6246 
 H 0:  C30 = C40+S  .0000  .0000 
 H 0:  C31 = C41+S  .1974  .0623 
 H 0:  C40 = C31  .0016  .0060 
 
 
Notes: See the notes to Table 4.  Appendix A 
 
Ownership and Market Share of Large Banks in Six Transition Economies 
 
 
 Asset 
Share 
Ownership Strategic   
owner 
      
Bulgaria   (2000)     
Bulbank     25.4  Privatized 10/ 00  10/00 
United Bulgarian Bank (UBB)  12.4  Privatized 5/97  7/00 
Derzhavna Spestovna Kassa 
(DSK) 
12.1 Privatized    5/03 
Biochim Bank  5.3  Privatized  10/02 
Bulgarian Post Bank  5.2  Privatized  11/98 
SG Express Bank  4.5  Privatized  11/99 
BNP-Dresdnerbank 3.5  Foreign  Greenfield   
Hebrosbank   3.4  Privatized  3/00 
First Investment Bank  3.3  Foreign Greenfield   
ING –Sofia  2.7  Foreign Greenfield   
Total 77.8    
      
Croatia (2000)    
Zagrebacka Banka  28.9 Domestic  Private 
Shares sold 12/99 
3/02 
Privredna Banka Zagreb  18.3  Domestic private; Nationalized 
1996; Privatized 12/99 
12/99 
Splitska Banka  7.1  Domestic private; Nationalized 
1996; Privatized 5/00 
5/00 
Rijecka Banka  7.0  Domestic private; Nationalized 
1996; Privatized 4/00 
4/00 
Raiffeisen Bank    4.5  Foreign Greenfield   
Hypo-Alde-Adria-Bank 3.4  Foreign  Greenfield   
Dubrovacka Banka       2.9  State owned, acquired by 
Dalmatinska 2/02 
 
Erste&Steiermaerkische Bank 2.7  Foreign  Greenfield   
Varazdinska Banka    2.6  Domestic private; Acquired by 
Zagrabacka Banka 6/00 
 
Dalmatinska Banka    2.3  Domestic private  10/00 
Total 79.7     
Czech Republic   (June 
2001) 
  
Ceskoslovenska Obchodni 
Banka (CSOB) 
21.4  Privatized 6/99 
Merged with IPB 6/00 
6/99 
Investicni a Postovni Banka 
(IPB) 
(part of 
CSOB) 
Voucher privatization 12/92  3/98 
Komercni Banka  18.4  Voucher privatization 12/92  6/01 
Ceska Sporitelna (CS)  15.7  Voucher privatization 12/92  2/00 
Konsolidacni banka * 
(Not a commercial bank)  
9.0  State owned bank for bad debts 
during bank restructuring. 
 
GE Capital  (Agrobanka)  2.9  Private domestic; Nationalized 
1996; Privatized 1998 
1998 
Commerzbank*      2.7  Foreign Greenfield   
Bank Austria / Credit Anstalt 
(BACA)  
2.6 Foreign  Greenfield   
Citibank   2.6  Foreign  Greenfield   
HypoVeriensbank 2.3  Foreign  Greenfield   
Deutsche Bank*   2.1  Foreign Greenfield   
Zivnostenska Bank    2.0  Domestic private  2/03 
ABN AMRO*   2.0  Foreign Greenfield   
Total (with Konsolidacni bank  
excluded from banking sector) 
80.0    
      
Hungary (1999)    
National Savings and 
Commercial Bank (OTP) 
25.1 Privatized  7/95   
Hungarian Foreign Trade 
Bank (MKB)   
9.6 Privatized  7/94  1996 
Central-European 
International Bank (CIB) 
8.0  Private domestic   1998 
Kereskedelmi es Hitelbank 
(K&H) 
7.7 Privatized  7/97 
Merged with ABN Amro 7/01 
7/01  
ABN Amro / Magyar Hitel 
Bank    
5.8 Privatized  12/96 
Merged with K&H 7/01 
12/96 
Postabank     4.7  Private domestic; Nationalized 
1998 
 
Budapest Bank (BB)  4.1  Privatized 12/95  12/95 
Bank Austria – Creditanstalt 
Hungary 
4.1 Foreign  Greenfield   
Raiffeisen Bank  3.7  Foreign Greenfield   
General Banking Trust  3.5  Privatized 1990  1996 
Total 76.3    
       
Poland (1999)    
Powszechny Kasa 
Oszczednosci-Bank 
Panstwowy (PKO BP) 
17.6  State owned   
Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A. 
Group (PeKaO  SA)  
17.5 Privatized  6/98  6/99 
Bank Przemyslowo-
Handlowy+Powszechny Bank 
Kredytowy (BPH+PBK) 
9.5  BPH privatized 1/95 
PBK privatized 10/97 
Merger 12/01 
BPH 
11/99 
PBK 
10/97 
Bank Handlowy+Citibank  8.0  Privatized 6/97  
Merged with Citibank 2/00 
2/00 
 
Bank Inicjatyw 
Gospdarczch+Bank Gdanski 
(BIG + BG) 
6.3  BIG Domestic private 
BG privatized 12/95 
Merger 9/98 
1/01 
 
Bank Slaski+ING-Barings 
(ING) 
5.5 Privatised  9/93 
Merged with ING 4/01 
7/96 
Wielkopolski Bank 
Kredytowy+ Bank Zachodni 
(WBK + BZ) 
5.4  WBK privatized 3/93 
BZ privatized 1999 
Merger 12/00 
WBK 
4/97 
BZ 1999 
Bank Gospordarki 
Zywnosciowej (BGZ) 
5.1 State  owned   
Kredyt Bank    4.3  Private domestic  1999 
Bank Rozwoju Eksportu 
(BRE) 
4.2 Privatized  6/92  10/00 
Total 83.4     
Romania (March 
2002) 
  
Banca Comercială Română 
(BCR)  
31.2  State owned   
Banca Română pentru 
Dezvoltare – Société  
Générale 
15.7 Privatized  3/99  3/99 
Casa de Economii şi 
Consemnaţiuni 
8.6 State  owned   
ABN Amro Bank  5.5  Foreign Greenfield   
ING Bank Bucharest Branch *  5.1  Foreign Greenfield   
Banc Post  4.1  Privatized 4/99   
Raiffeisen –Banca Agricolă 3.5  Privatized  7/01  7/01 
Banca Comercială „Ion 
Ţiriac” 
3.1 Private  domestic   
Citibank     3.1  Foreign Greenfield   
ALPHA Bank  2.7  Foreign Greenfield   
Total 82.6    
 
 
Notes 
 
(i)  The symbol * indicates that the bank is not included in sample. For these foreign 
greeenfield banks, no data are reported in BankScope because the bank’s balance 
sheet is consolidated with its parent.  Konsolidacni Banka is excluded because it is 
not a commercial bank. 
  
(ii)  The PeKaO Group in Poland includes three of the original nine commercial banks 
hived off from the portfolio of the Central Bank.  These are Pomorski Bank 
Kredytowy (PBKS) in Szczecin, Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy (BDK) in Lublin, and 
Powszechny Bank Gospardarczy (PBG) in Lodz.   
 
(iii)  Although not effectuated in 1999, the mergers of some Polish banks, i.e., BPH+PBK, 
Bank Handlowy+Citibank, Bank Slaski+ING, and WBK+BZ, are considered to be 
merged in the table so that we add the assets of the partners in 1999 to obtain the 
newly merged entity’s market share. 
 
 
Sources:  Annual reports of the National Bank of Croatia, the National Bank of Bulgaria, the 
National Bank of Hungary and the National Bank of Romania as well as annual reports of 
individual banks.  In addition, data are also taken from Ceska Bankovni Asociace (Czech 
Republic) and Hungarian Banking Association, 2000.  Data for Poland are taken from Najlepsze 
Banki, 2000 and Gazeta Bankowa, June 10, 2000, p.31.   
 
 Appendix B 
 
Summary of Stochastic Frontier Estimates 
 
 
 Cost 
efficiency  
Profit 
efficiency  
Commission 
income 
efficiency  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Log Likelihood  -129.3  -531.1  -271.2 
σ u   /  σ v    2.93  4.59  1.73 
σ 0.689  1.576  0.708 
λ .90  .95  .75 
Mean efficiency   0.786  0.445  0.758 
Standard deviation   0.219  0.237  0.207 
 
 
Notes  
 
(i)  See the text for an explanation of the frontier specification. 
(ii)  Frontiers were estimated with the 431 bank observations that contain all the data 
needed for the estimation. Missing information reduced our sample size by only 20 
observations from the sample used in the means tests. 
(iii)  σ u and σ v  are the standard deviations of the composite of the inefficiency and 
random components of the disturbance, respectively.   
(iv)  σ is the standard deviation of the overall disturbance, i.e., (u+v) for the cost function 
and (u-v) for the profit function.   
(v)  λ =σu
2/ σ
2 is the proportion of the variance in the overall disturbance that is due to 
inefficiency. 
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